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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 96-3531 
 
ZELLEKA GETAHUN, 
       Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING 
OFFICER OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR 
IMMIGRATION REVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
 
       DUPONT MERCK PHARMACEUTICAL 
       COMPANY, 
       Intervenor-Respondent 
 
On Petition for Review of Final Order of the 
Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer 
of the Executive Office for Immigration Review 
of the United States Department of Justice 
(OCAHO Case No. 94B 00187(1996)) 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 24, 1997 
 
Before: SCIRICA and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
and DEBEVOISE, Senior District Judge* 
 
(Filed: September 15, 1997) 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
*Honorable Dickinson R. Debevoise, United States Senior District Judge 
for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation. 
 
 
 
       ANN M. BADMUS, ESQUIRE 
       260 Chapman Road, Suite 100C 
       Newark, Delaware 19702 
 
        Attorney for Petitioner 
 
       ROBERT J. SMITH, ESQUIRE 
       Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 
       1800 M Street, N.W. 
       Washington, D.C. 20036 
 
        Attorney for Intervenor-Respondent 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
DEBEVOISE, Senior District Judge. 
 
Petitioner, Dr. Zelleka Getahun, filed a complaint with 
the United States Department of Justice's Executive Office 
for Immigration Review, Office of the Chief Administrative 
Hearing Officer ("OCAHO") pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
S 1324b(d)(2), charging that her former employer, 
Intervenor-Respondent DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical 
Company ("DuPont Merck"), committed "document abuse" 
in violation of 8 U.S.C. S 1324b(a)(6) when it terminated her 
employment on October 27, 1993. The Administrative Law 
Judge to whom the case was assigned granted DuPont 
Merck's motion for summary decision, holding that Dr. 
Getahun was not authorized to accept employment in the 
United States and thus lacked standing to assert a claim 
under S 1324b. Dr. Getahun filed a petition for review in 
this Court. 
 
We will reverse the order of the ALJ dismissing Dr. 
Getahun's complaint and remand the case for further 
proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 
 
A. The Facts 
 
On January 10, 1991 Dr. Getahun began employment 
with DuPont Merck. She had previously applied for political 
asylum and had received an employment authorization 
document which had a November 1991 expiration date. At 
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the time of her employment with DuPont Merck she 
completed the mandatory INS Form I-9 and submitted her 
Maryland driver's license and her Social Security number 
card as evidence of her employability. She attested on the 
Form I-9 that she was an alien authorized by the INS to 
work in the United States but did not complete the blank 
space calling for the expiration date of her employment 
authorization. 
 
On October 25, 1991 Dr. Getahun's application for 
political asylum was granted. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 
S 208.20, as in effect in 1991, employment authorization 
was automatically granted or continued for persons granted 
asylum: 
 
       When an alien's application for asylum is granted, he 
       is granted asylum status for an indefinite period. 
       Employment authorization is automatically granted or 
       continued for persons granted asylum or withholding of 
       deportation unless the alien is detained pending 
       removal to a third country. Appropriate documentation 
       showing employment authorization shall be provided 
       by the INS. 
 
However, 8 C.F.R. S 274a.12 provides that an alien 
granted asylum "who seeks to be employed in the United 
States, must apply to the Service for a document evidencing 
such employment authorization." 
 
In November 1991 Dr. Getahun informed DuPont Merck's 
Human Resources Department that her application for 
political asylum had been granted. A department 
representative informed her that DuPont Merck would 
assist her in adjusting her status to permanent resident. 
Dr. Getahun applied neither for permanent residency nor 
for a new EAD based upon the grant of political asylum. 
 
In October 1993 DuPont Merck's Human Resources 
Department, in conjunction with its Legal Department, 
instituted an internal audit of the Form I-9 of each 
employee to ensure that it was in compliance with the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA"), 8 
U.S.C. S 1324. Dr. Getahun's Form I-9 was among those 
found to be defective. It failed to set forth the date on which 
her EAD expired. 
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On October 21 Mary Beth Desmond of DuPont Merck's 
Human Resources Department brought this to Dr. 
Getahun's attention. The next day Dr. Getahun met with 
other members of the department. The parties' accounts of 
what was said differ. Dr. Getahun asserts that she was 
informed that she had to obtain a receipt evidencing her 
application for permanent residence and that if she did not 
provide such a receipt by October 27, 1993 she would be 
terminated. 
 
Whatever the substance of the conversation, on October 
25, 1993 Dr. Getahun gave a certified copy of the 
Memorandum of Decision and Order granting her political 
asylum to the Human Resources Department. She also 
went to the INS office in Philadelphia to apply for 
permanent residence. The INS clerk would not accept her 
application because she did not have her birth certificate 
from Ethiopia. However, on the advice of the clerk she 
applied for an EAD based upon her political asylum status 
and obtained a document fee receipt. On the morning of 
October 27 Dr. Getahun returned to the INS with her birth 
certificate and filed for permanent residence, obtaining the 
appropriate document fee receipt. 
 
Also on October 27 DuPont Merck's Human Resources 
Department called Dr. Getahun to schedule an 
appointment. When Dr. Getahun appeared she provided the 
fee receipts for the applications for permanent residence 
and for the EAD. Nevertheless the Department proceeded 
with the termination.1 It provided Dr. Getahun with a letter 
of termination which stated that even though she had 
presented a valid U.S. driver's license and Social Security 
card containing no limitation on engaging in authorized 
employment, because her interim EAD had expired, 
"DuPont Merck is required by law to ask you for additional 
documents to establish your eligibility to engage in lawful 
employment with DuPont Merck." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Six weeks after her termination Dr. Getahun received her EAD 
evidencing her work authorization pursuant to her asylum status, and 
on April 14, 1994 she was granted permanent residence, effective 
February 1, 1993. 
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DuPont Merck rejected Dr. Getahun's two document 
receipts evidencing her application for permanent residency 
and for an asylum-based EAD purportedly on the advice of 
an official at the INS office of the General Counsel in 
Washington, D.C., with whom DuPont Merck's legal counsel 
had communicated. The letter of termination stated that 
DuPont Merck had been "advised that an employer may 
accept a receipt for a replacement document if the employee 
completes section 1 on Form I-9 by indicating either that he 
or she is a U.S. permanent resident or a foreign national 
authorized to work until a specified date." The letter further 
stated, in effect, that since Dr. Getahun could not provide 
an expiration date of her work authorization, she could not 
rely on the receipts. As will be described below, DuPont 
Merck's rationale with respect to the document receipts 
constituted a misapplication of the INS legal memorandum 
upon which it apparently relied and an erroneous 
interpretation of the applicable law and regulations. 
 
B. The ALJ's Decision 
 
Dr. Getahun filed a charge of document abuse against 
DuPont Merck with the United States Department of 
Justice's Office of Special Counsel ("OSC") as permitted by 
8 U.S.C. S 1324b(b)(1). The OSC decided not to issue a 
complaint, finding that DuPont Merck had not violated the 
provisions of IRCA because Dr. Getahun, as an asylee, had 
failed to timely file for and obtain a required work 
authorization document. Thereupon Dr. Getahun filed a 
complaint against her former employer with the OCAHO as 
permitted by 8 U.S.C. S 1324b(d)(2). 
 
Each side filed a Motion for Summary Decision supported 
by memoranda and affidavits. The rules of practice and 
procedure for administrative hearings before ALJs in cases 
involving allegations of unfair immigration related 
employment practices provide for entry of a summary 
decision if the pleadings, affidavits, material obtained by 
discovery or otherwise, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact. 28 C.F.R. S 68.38(c). 
 
The ALJ noted that 8 U.S.C. S 1324 b(a)(1), which defines 
unfair immigration related employment practices, excludes 
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from its protections an unauthorized alien, as defined in 
S 1324a(h)(3). An "unauthorized alien" is defined in 
S 1324a(h)(3) as an alien who "is not ... either (A) an alien 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or (B) 
authorized to be so employed by this chapter or by the 
Attorney General." 
 
Dr. Getahun was not admitted for permanent residence 
at the time DuPont Merck terminated her employment. The 
ALJ found that in addition Dr. Getahun was not authorized 
to be employed in the United States. He reasoned that 
"[o]nce [Dr. Getahun's] interim EAD expired in November 
1991, she was affirmatively obligated to obtain a new EAD. 
... It is undisputed that [Dr. Getahun] did not apply for or 
receive a replacement document evidencing her work 
authorization. Therefore, as she lacked INS-issued 
documentation evidencing her work authorization, she was 
not eligible to accept employment in the United States, and 
thus was not eligible for the document abuse protections of 
IRCA set forth at 8 U.S.C. S 1324b(a)(6)." 
 
On the ground that, lacking work authorization, Dr. 
Getahun did not have standing to proceed with an 
immigration related employment discrimination claim, the 
ALJ granted DuPont Merck's motion for summary decision 
but denied its request for attorneys' fees. This petition for 
review followed. 
 
C. Decision 
 
The OCAHO had jurisdiction of this case pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. S 1324b(d)(2). This court has jurisdiction to review 
the order dismissing Dr. Getahun's complaint pursuant to 
8 U.S.C. S 1324b(i)(1). 
 
The standards governing the entry of summary judgment 
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) in federal court cases are applied 
in determining whether summary decision under 28 C.F.R. 
S 68.38(c) is appropriate in OCAHO cases. Alvarez v. 
Interstate Highway Construction, 3 OCAHO 430 at 17 
(1992). Consequently, as in the case of a review of a district 
court's granting a motion for summary judgment, we 
exercise plenary review of the OCAHO decision resolving a 
motion for summary decision. Summary judgment is 
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appropriate only when, after consideration of the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, no 
genuine issue of material fact remains in dispute and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). 
In this petition for review there is no issue of material fact. 
Rather, the question is whether on October 27, 1993 under 
the applicable statutes and regulations Dr. Getahun was 
authorized to be employed in the United States. OCAHO's 
conclusion that she was not so authorized is a question of 
law subject to plenary review. 
 
Dr. Getahun seeks relief under 8 U.S.C. S 1324b(a)(1) and 
S 1324b(a)(6). Section 1324b(a)(1) provides in general terms 
that, except as to unauthorized aliens, "[i]t is an unfair 
immigration-related employment practice ... to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to hiring ... of the 
individual for employment or the discharging of the 
individual from employment...." 
 
Under S 1324b(a)(6) it is an unfair immigration related 
employment practice relating to the hiring of individuals to 
request "more or different documents than are required 
under [S 1324a(b)] or refusing to honor documents tendered 
that on their face appear to be genuine...." 
 
The ALJ concluded that Dr. Getahun was not entitled to 
assert a claim under these provisions because she was an 
"unauthorized alien", i.e., an alien not authorized to work. 
We apply a de novo standard of review to an agency's 
conclusions of law, although some deference is given to an 
agency's reasonable construction of a statute it is charged 
with administering. Mester Mfg. Co. v. I.N.S., 879 F.2d 561 
(9th Cir. 1989). No amount of deference, however, would 
permit the conclusion that an alien who had been granted 
asylum and who had applied for (but had not received) an 
EAD was not authorized to work. 
 
The ALJ's conclusion that Dr. Getahun was not 
authorized to work in the United States on October 27, 
1993 because she had not applied for a renewal of her 
interim EAD when it expired in November 1991, failed to 
give effect to the October 25, 1991 order granting her 
application for political asylum. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 
 
                                7 
 
 
 
S 208.20 (as it read in 1991), "[w]hen an alien's application 
for asylum is granted, he is granted asylum status for an 
indefinite period. Employment authorization is automatically 
granted or continued for persons granted asylum...." 
(Emphasis added.) It is true that 8 C.F.R. S 274a.12 
requires that an alien granted asylum who seeks to be 
employed must apply for an EAD. This is different from an 
interim EAD granted to a person who has an application for 
asylum pending. 
 
By the time Dr. Getahun's interim EAD expired in 
November 1991, her application for asylum had already 
been granted. By virtue of the grant of asylum her 
employment authorization was "automatically" granted or 
continued. There would have been no reason thereafter to 
apply for a replacement of her interim EAD when it expired 
the following month. The ALJ was clearly in error when he 
ruled that Dr. Getahun was not authorized to be employed 
because she "did not apply for or receive a replacement" 
interim EAD.2 
 
Dr. Getahun argues with considerable persuasiveness 
that 8 C.F.R. S 208.20 as it existed in 1991 was self- 
executing and that it provided employment authorization 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The ALJ's rationale would have been applicable only if Dr. Getahun's 
application for asylum had not been granted. In that situation Dr. 
Getahun would have been an alien who had filed an application for 
asylum which had not been decided and who "must apply for work 
authorization." 8 C.F.R. S 274a.12(c)(8). Only "[i[f authorized" could 
such 
person accept employment. In that case "authorization ... shall 
automatically terminate upon ... [t]he expiration date specified [by the 
EAD]." 8 C.F.R. S 274a.14(a)(1)(i). However, at the time in question these 
provisions had no relevance to Dr. Getahun, because she was no longer 
an applicant for asylum "whose application has not been decided." 
 
The OSC who initially received Dr. Getahun's complaint reached his 
determination on a different ground from that of the ALJ, but it was 
equally meritless. He recognized that Dr. Getahun's application for 
asylum had been granted but rejected her claim because "she did not 
timely apply for the [EAD]." There is nothing in the regulations either as 
they existed in 1991 or after the amendment of S 208.20 which imposes 
time limitations for applying for an EAD after being granted asylum. The 
ALJ appropriately did not rely on this ground. 
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whether or not the asylee applied for a new EAD. 3 
According to this view, authorization was automatic (as 
S 208.20 specifically stated) and an EAD was simply 
evidence of such authorization. However, this question need 
not be addressed, because before DuPont Merck terminated 
Dr. Getahun she had applied for a new EAD as required by 
8 C.F.R. S 274a.12. She had received a document receipt 
evidencing the application, and she presented the 
document receipt to DuPont Merck. 
 
In accordance with 8 C.F.R. S 274a.2(b)(vi), the Form I-9 
states that "[i]f employees are authorized to work, but are 
unable to present the required document(s) within three 
business days, they must present a receipt for the 
application of [sic] the document(s) within three business 
days and the actual document(s) within ninety (90) days." 
Dr. Getahun fully met the requirements of the option of 
presenting a document receipt in lieu of an EAD. She was 
authorized to work by virtue of S 208.20, and she presented 
a receipt for the application for an EAD. By the same token 
she had met any condition imposed by S 208.20 that she 
apply for an EAD, and she had met the requirement of 
S 274a.12 that she apply for an asylee EAD. 
 
DuPont Merck's reason for demanding further 
documentation - the actual EAD - is meritless. It apparently 
relied on an undated communication written by R. Michael 
Miller, Acting Assistant Commissioner, to John L. Shaw, 
Assistant Commissioner Investigations (App. at 81). The 
question had been raised whether in the case of an F-1 
student who had applied for employment authorization, a 
fee receipt was an acceptable document for employer 
verification purposes. Mr. Miller's response was that "a fee 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The language of S 208.20 has been amended to impose an obligation 
(without any time limitation) upon an asylee who intends to be employed 
to apply for an EAD: 
 
        An alien granted asylum and eligible derivative family members 
       are authorized to be employed in the United States pursuant to 
       S 274a.12(a)(5) of this chapter and if intending to be employed, 
must 
       apply to the INS for a document evidencing such authorization. The 
       INS shall issue such document within 30 days of the receipt of the 
       application therefor. 
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receipt is acceptable ... only if the alien indicates that 
he/she is authorized to accept employment in the United 
States at the time of hire." On the other hand, "an alien 
seeking an initial period of employment authorization is not 
authorized to work in the United States nor to present a fee 
receipt as evidence of work authorization for purposes of 
employer verification." This advice was in accordance with 
the provision of 8 C.F.R. S 274a.2(b)(vi) permitting use of 
document receipts, which states that "[t]his section is not 
applicable to an alien who indicates that he or she does not 
have work authorization at the time of hire." 
 
DuPont Merck erroneously equated Dr. Getahun with the 
student who was applying for authorization to work, an 
authorization which might or might not be granted. In such 
a situation a fee receipt would be inadequate. Dr. Getahun, 
on the other hand, had an absolute right to work, having 
been granted asylum and having applied for an EAD. 
DuPont Merck was required to accept a document receipt in 
lieu of the applied for EAD. 
 
To justify its termination of Dr. Getahun's employment 
DuPont Merck relies upon its continuing obligation under 
applicable statutes and regulations to verify the 
employment eligibility of alien employees. Initial verification 
of employment eligibility is accomplished through the 
completion of INS Form I-9. 8 C.F.R. S 274a.2(a). This form 
contains two sections. The top section requires that the 
employee set forth information about herself including, if 
an alien, the expiration date of any employment 
authorization. The bottom section of the form requires the 
employee to produce and the employer to examine either a 
List A document or one document from List B and one 
document from List C. At the time of her employment in 
January 1991 Dr. Getahun did not provide the expiration 
date of her EAD at the top of the form. She provided a 
Maryland driver's license, a List B document, and she 
provided an unrestricted Social Security number card, a 
List C document. 
 
IRCA requires that employers verify the identity and 
employment authorization of all employees hired after 
November 6, 1986. IRCA makes it unlawful to continue to 
employ an alien knowing that the alien is or has become 
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unauthorized to accept employment. 8 U.S.C. S 1324a(a)(2). 
An employer is obligated to reverify the employment 
eligibility of its employees not later than the date the work 
authorization expires. 8 C.F.R. S 274a.2(b)(vii). Employers 
are subject to penalties for failure to comply with their 
obligation to verify employment eligibility in the manner 
provided by the statute and regulations. 8 U.S.C. 
SS 1324a(e)(4), 1324a(e)(5), 1324a(f). 
 
In light of these statutory responsibilities DuPont Merck 
was fully authorized, in fact required, to question Dr. 
Getahun and seek supplemental documentation when, 
during the course of its 1993 internal employee audit, it 
learned that the Maryland driver's license which Dr. 
Getahun had originally produced had expired and, in 
particular, when it learned that the interim EAD pursuant 
to which she had been employed had expired in 1991. Dr. 
Getahun responded to these inquiries and produced 
documentation establishing that she was authorized to 
accept employment. The fact that DuPont Merck was 
performing its obligation to verify employment eligibility did 
not insulate it from a charge of document abuse. 
 
The ALJ never reached the question whether DuPont 
Merck's actions constituted document abuse. He stopped 
after arriving at the clearly erroneous conclusion that Dr. 
Getahun was not authorized to be employed and that 
therefore Dr. Getahun did not have standing to bring an 
action pursuant to 8 U.S.C. S 1324b(d)(2). There are facts in 
the record which would support a finding that the refusal 
to accept the documents which Dr. Getahun presented 
constituted document abuse in violation of 8 U.S.C. 
S 1324b(a)(6). However, this is an issue which the OCAHO 
should address in the first instance. 
 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons set forth above the order dismissing Dr. 
Getahun's complaint will be reversed and the case 
remanded to the OCAHO for reconsideration of Dr. 
Getahun's motion for summary decision and for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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